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SHORT ARTICLES
PRIVILEGE, POLICE POWER AND RES EXTRA

COMMERCIUM - GLARING CONCEPTUAL ERRORS
Arvind P. Datar*
In this article,the authorcritiques the Indian Supreme Court'sunderstandingof
the concepts ofprivilege,police powerand res extra commercium andsuggests
that these have been incorrectly applied in the context of trade in noxious
substances. After tracing the evolution of these concepts throughIndian case
law and in other jurisdictions,he argues that the principlesof privilege and
police power originatedin the United Kingdom and United States respectively in
specific contexts. Therefore, they cannot be applied to the Indian constitutional
scheme as the Constitutionhas otherprovisions to regulate the same subject
matter.The authoralso contends that the Supreme Courthas misinterpretedand
misappliedthe res extra commercium doctrine,and cannot use it to restrictthe
fundamental right to tradegranted to all citizens in the Constitution.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For the last six decades, the Supreme Court has applied the concepts of
privilege, police power and res extra commercium incorrectly. While the concept of
privilege and police power is legally correct, it has no application to a Republic
which has a Constitution. Res extra commercium has been completely misunderstood
by all of us (including the present writer). This Latin expression has been held to
be the foundation to declare that there is no fundamental right to trade in liquor
*
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or any other noxious or harmful substance. As this article later shows, this Latin
maxim does not have the remotest connection with alcohol, drugs or any other
harmful activity. It is indeed ironic that while the Supreme Court has repeatedly
remarked that liquor and gambling are harmful activities, the major source of
revenue of most States is the sale of potable alcohol or what is paradoxically called
"Indian-made Foreign Liquor". Article 47 promotes total prohibition as a desired
goal although history shows that prohibition, in its wake, does more harm than
good. Similarly, large sums of money are generated through State-run lotteries.
The Supreme Court has been considerably influenced by morality while
delineating the boundaries of trade in our Constitution. States, in their desire to
have the cake and eat it too, have conveniently fallen back on terms such as police
power and res extra commercium to justify capricious action on their part in matters
such as auctioning of privilege and imposition of license fee.
In this article, I have examined three important constitutional concepts relied
on by the Supreme Court of India, which form the bedrock of our constitutional
jurisprudence on trade in noxious substances. They are the privilege theory, the
doctrine of police power, and the res extra commercium principle. Of these, the privilege
theory finds application mainly in cases concerning regulation of the liquor trade.
The police power doctrine has been used as the foundation for laws that concern
public health and safety, including zoning regulations. The res extra commercium principle
excludes any noxious substance, as so understood by the Court, from the ambit of
trade and the rights conferred by Articles 19(1)(g) and Articles 304.1 have explored the
historical foundation of each of these concepts and analysed their relevance, if any, in
the Indian constitutional scheme. Trade in liquor has been specifically used to illustrate
the pitfalls of applying each of these concepts, since this is one trade where all of them
have been interchangeably used by the Supreme Court of India.

II.

"PARTING WITH PRIVILEGE":

A

TALE OF LIQUOR

REGULATIONS
Over the last 50 years, one principle that has been consistently applied in
the context of trade in liquor or potable alcohol is the privilege theory. The Supreme
Court has continuously observed that there is no right to trade in liquor and this
is exclusively the state's privilege.
The finest discussion on the theory of privilege is contained in the judgment
of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in C.S.S. Motor Services v. State.' The
Division Bench consisted of two outstanding judges: Chief Justice Rajamannar and
Justice Venkatarama Iyer. Chief Justice Rajamannar and Chief Justice Chagla have
often been referred to as the finest amongst the Chief Justices that India has ever had.
Their judgments are remarkable for felicity of expression and outstanding
1

A. I. R. 1953 Mad. 279 [Madras High Court].
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scholarship. Justice Venkatarama Iyer later went to the Supreme Court and delivered
several historical judgments including the judgment in Madrasv. Gannon Dunkerley2
and R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalav. Union. Quite ironically, his judgment in the latter case
has given birth to the application of the res extra commercium doctrine in wholly
inapplicable contexts, as is pointed out subsequently in this article.
C.S.S. Motor Services questioned the validity of several provisions of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939. It was submitted that the public roads belong to the State and no
citizen can claim as a matter of right that they are entitled to carry on business on
the roads and streets and use them for earning profit. When the State permits the
streets to be used for the purpose of business, it is a privilege and not a right. This
submission made by Shri M.K. Nambiar was supported by numerous American
authorities. This argument was countered by contending that the American law
relating to business, etc. was different from the right conferred under Article 19(1)(g).
The fundamental right to carry on business in the Indian Constitution was not one
of the freedoms expressly protected by the American Constitution. The grant of a
monopoly to a corporation that was challenged by the butchers of New Orleans in
1873 was used as an example. Here, the argument was that the butchers had the
right to carry on business as part of the due process clause introduced by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the year 1868. In this
case, Justice Bradley delivered a dissenting judgment where he observed that the
rights of life, liberty and property permit an individual citizen to be free to adopt
such calling, profession or trade as may be seen as most conducive to him. Without
this right, a citizen cannot be a free man.4 Four years later, the right to carry on
business was treated as part of the due process clause by Justice Field.Justice Venkatarama Iyer pointed out that the right to carry on business
came to be recognized in the United States as one of the liberties protected by the
Constitution but it did not have the full status of the freedoms specifically
mentioned in the United States Constitution such as freedom of speech, of person
and of religion. Justice Iyer remarked that the right to carry on business was
viewed somewhat in the light of an interloper or parvenu6 among them. He went
on to add that the right to carry on business did not occupy an exalted position
like the other freedoms. On the other hand, under the Indian Constitution, the
2
3

4
6

6

A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 560 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 628 [S. C.].
Slaughter-House Cases, (1873) 27 L. Ed. 394, 421, 423.
Munn v. Illinois, (1877) 24 L. Ed. 77, 90. Similar views were expressed in Butchers
Union v. Crescent City Co., (1880) 28 L. Ed. 585, 591, Powell v. Pennsylvania (1888) 32
L. Ed. 253, 256, Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 41 L. Ed 832.
The Oxford Dictionary defines parvenu as "a person of obscure origin who has
gained wealth, influence, or celebrity". When used as an adjective, it means "having
recently achieved, or associated with someone who has recently achieved, wealth,
influence, or celebrity despite obscure origins"
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right to carry on business was a freedom expressly protected under Article 19(1)(g)
and it was placed on the same footing as the freedom of speech. Therefore, the
decisions of the American Courts on the right to carry on business and the
observations therein, had to be used with reserve.
The Madras High Court then discussed the origin of franchise or privilege
and remarked that it had an English origin. Franchise was a grant made by the
sovereign in exercise of the royal prerogative. Indeed, Blackstone defined
"franchise" as "Royal Privilege or branch of the King's prerogative subsisting in
the hands of a subject" The conception of franchise was, therefore, bound with
the prerogative of the Crown and, by its very nature, could have no place in
America or in India. Justice lyer then pointed out that franchise continued to live
on in America with an altered complexion. Granting exclusive right to a particular
company by a legislature was treated as a franchise. With the passage of time,
the view that monopoly rights conferred by statutes might be treated as being in
the nature of franchises became a part of American jurisprudence.
Justice Story had, however, expressed a dissenting view in Charles River
Bridgev. The Warren Bridge,7 and observed that the American legislature never had
any royal prerogative. This prerogative was based on the divine rights of the
king and on a sense of their exalted dignity and pre-eminence over all subjects. It
was also founded upon the notion that they were entitled to special favours for
the protection of their rights and office. This view was followed by the Madras
High Court and it was held that Article 19(1)(g) made no distinction between
common law trades which could be carried on by all persons and prerogative
trades which could be carried on only under state grants.
This view taken by the Madras High Court was approved by the Supreme
Court. Justice B.K. Mukherjee complimented the analysis made by Justice Iyer in
the 1954 decision by a five-judge bench in Saghir Ahmad v. Uttar Pradesh,' and till
date no one has taken a contrary view.

III.

PRIVILEGE AND POLICE POWER

In West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose,' Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri referred to
0
some of the observations made in A.K. Gopalanv. Madras. In the latter case, Justice
Das had observed that the content of due process of law had to be narrowed
down by the enunciation and application of the new doctrine of "police power"
as an antidote or palliative to the former. Justice Sastri in the Bose case raised a
question whether the antidote doctrine of police power could have any existence
7

(1837) 9 L. Ed. 773.

8

A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 728 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 92 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1950 S. C. 27 [S. C.].

9

10
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when the Constitution had rejected the doctrine of due process of law. After due
process of law was brought into our Constitution by Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India," could police power automatically follow? To answer this question, it is
necessary to study the origin of police power in the United States.

A. Police Power in the United States
In the United States, the doctrine of police power is recognized as a distinct
and specific legislative power and is taken as the basis for exercising social control
2
and regulation of private rights and freedom for the common good.' A term visibly
absent in the United States Constitution, it was coined by Chief Justice John Marshall
in Brown v. Maryland." This was certainly not so much of a break from the past, as the
power of the States had been visualised along similar lines even before the United
States Constitution came into force. Santiago Legarre has, in a recent article, traced
the historical foundations of this doctrine." According to him, the interchangeable
use of the words "police" and "policy-making" in early common law played a
significant role in the later coinage of the expression "police power". One strong
reason for this use was the perception of the King as a paterfamilias,one who had the
additional responsibility of taking care of the community and spearheading the
pursuit of the common good." This wider conception of "police", which included
the preservation of public morals, continued till the nineteenth century. It still
continues in American constitutional jurisprudence through the police power
doctrine but no longer finds any place in other common law countries.
From the earliest decision in Brown v. Maryland,'"it is evident that the police
power doctrine was considered important in preserving the power of the States
in the federal structure of the United States' 7 Congress could not rely on police
power to justify any enactment since that would shift the balance of power to the
11
12

13

14
15
1o

17

A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 597 [S. C.].
As held by the United States Supreme Court in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U. S. 560,
569 (1991), the traditional police power of the States is the basis for legislative
authority to provide for "public health, safety, and morals"
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827).
Santiago Legarre, The HistoricalBackground of the Police Power, 9 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 745
(2007).
M. D. Dubber, 'The Power to Govern Men and Things': PatriarchalOrigins of the Police
Power in American Law, 52 BUFFALO L.REv. 1277 (2004).
25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 442-43 (1827). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, " IIhe
power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch of the police power, which
unquestionably remains, and ought to remain, with the States (emphasis supplied)."
Legarre cites the Federalist Papers as indicative of this intent. Alexander Hamilton

in The Federalist No. 32 observed that since the Federal Convention aimed only at
a partial Union or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly retain all
the rights of sovereignty which they before had and which were not by that act
exclusively delegated to the United States.
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Union and away from the States.'" The pivotal role played by this doctrine also
necessitated prescription of its exact ambit, an area where there is absolutely no
clarity or certainty.19
One view has been that police power is broad enough to embrace within
its ambit familiar forms of the exercise of State sovereignty such as eminent
domain, taxation, and administration of justice. 20 In contrast, some decisions of
the United States Supreme Court have confined police power to the realm of
public health, safety and morality.21 Strikingly, in Gonzales v. Raich,22 a majority of
the Court held that the Federal Controlled Substances Act, which prevents ill
people from possessing, obtaining, or manufacturing marijuana for their personal
medical use, did not infringe the reserved police powers of California. The decision
in Lawrence v. Texas 2' has been perceived as sounding the death knell for police
power in the realm of enforcement of public morality. Thus, the traditional domain
of this doctrine, even taking a narrow view of its ambit, has not been left
unchallenged.

B. Relevance ofPolice Power in India
As rightly reasoned in West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, in marked contrast
24

with the United States, the legislative powers have been specifically enumerated
and distributed in India. There is specific distribution of legislative power among
the Union and State Legislatures through the three lists in the Seventh Schedule.
Therefore, the power of eminent domain, which is assumed to be inherent in the
sovereignty of the State by Continental and American jurists, though not expressly
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 566 (1995). In the words of the Supreme Court,
"[t]he Constitution ... withold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would
authorize enactment of every type of legislation."
For the controversy surrounding this doctrine, see, Christopher Supino, The Police
Power And 'Public Use': Balancing The Public Interest Against Private Rights Through
Principled ConstitutionalDistinctions, 110W. VA. L. REv. 711 (2008).

Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 504, 583 (1847), Mayor of New York v.
Miln, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 102, 103 (1837). See, D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Powerand the
Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471 (2004).
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887), Butchers' Union v. Crescent Live-Stock Co.,
111 U. S. 746 (1884),New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. La. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650 (1885).
See, Christopher Wolfe, Moving Beyond Rhetoric, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1065 (2005).
545 U. S. 1 (2005). Sandra Day O'Connor, J. dissented, taking the view that "[t]he
States' core police powers have always included authority to define criminal law
and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens."
539 U. S. 558 (2003). Here, the U. S. Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute that
criminalised homosexual sodomy and applied it to consenting adults acting in
private.
A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 92 [S. C.].
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provided for in the American Constitution, is made the subject of an express
grant in our Constitution.2 5 The right to property is subject to limitations
mentioned in Article 31. In the light of such specific articulation of the right and
the permissible restrictions, Chief Justice Sastri concluded that the doctrine of
police power was contrary to our Constitutional scheme. It was incorrect to
interpret Article 31(1) as conferring police power on the legislature in relation to
the right of property. He affirmed the observations of Justice B.K. Mukherjee in
ChiranjitLal Chowdhuri v. Union,26 that "the importing of expressions like "police
power", which is a term of variable and indefinite connotation in American law,
can only make the task of interpretation more difficult".27
Our Constitution guarantees the right to carry on business. Reasonable
restrictions can be imposed to curtail this right on the grounds mentioned under
Article 19(6). When the right and its extent are clearly spelt out in the Constitution,
there is no necessity to rely on a vague and unwritten doctrine of police power to
define the scope of this right.

C. Police Power Haunts Us till Date
Despite the decisive rejection of the theory of police power in West Bengal v.
Subodh Gopal Bose,28 this power has been relied on in a number of cases.
The judgment in Cooverjee Bharuchav. Excise Commissioner,Ajmer,2 9 delivered
on January 13, 1954,30 dealt with auction of license to run a liquor shop.31 Chief
Justice Mahajan adopted the police power theory to justify regulation of trade in
liquor. Reference was made to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Crowleyv. Christensen.3 This judgment had pointed out the harmful effect of alcohol
and held that "the police power of State" was broad enough to regulate the
25
26

West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, A. 1. R. 1954 S. C. 92 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 41 [S. C.].

27

Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union, A. 1. R. 1951 S. C. 41 [S. C.].

28

A. I. R. 1954 S. C.92 [S. C.].

29

A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 220 [S. C.].
This judgment was delivered after the decision in Subodh Gopal v. West Bengal,
A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 92 [S.C.], which was rendered on 17.12.1953. I lowever, it does not
refer to the latter case.
The Petitioner had participated in the auction. The Fifth Respondent, who was the
highest bidder, had to pay half the bid amount within a particular date, and he
failed to do. Despite this, upon late payment, the license was confirmed in his
name. The Petitioner challenged this confirmation as being in violation of his right
under Article 19(1)(g). Instead of merely asking the Petitioner to approach the
High Court to work out his remedy under Article 226, the Supreme Court went on
to make certain observations on the applicability of the police power doctrine.
(1890) 34 L. Ed. 620.

3o

31

32
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business of liquor and even suppress it entirely. The Court had also held that
there was no inherent right in the citizen to sell intoxicating liquors. The Indian
Supreme Court fell into error by importing the ambiguous police power doctrine,
when the conclusion arrived at by the United States Supreme Court in Crowley v.
Christensen' could have been arrived at using the specific provisions of our
Constitution.
It is submitted that the concept of prohibition on the sale of alcohol can be
justified under Article 19(6) read with Article 47. The complete ban on the sale of
ready-made garments, to give an example, could be challenged under Articles 14
and 19(1)(g). It could be a strong argument here that total prohibition of sale of
garments would amount to an unreasonable restriction. However, in the case of
liquor, the State can defend a total ban by relying on Article 47 which makes total
prohibition a social goal. Despite this, the Supreme Court in Cooverjee Bharucha v.
Excise Commissioner, Ajmer, 4 wrongly resorted to police power. This wrongful
application of police power has continued till date. The police power doctrine has
been repeatedly followed in a number of cases.3
Unfortunately, the judiciary has not examined the relevance of police power
under our constitutional scheme. In P.N. Kaushal v. Union," Justice Krishna Iyer
held that "any Government, with workers' weal and their families' survival at
heart, would use its "police power" under Article 19(6) read with Section 59(f)(v)
of the Act to forbid alcohol sales on pay days" This observation was watered
down in a later paragraph where the learned Judge conceded that police power,
as developed in the United States, was inapplicable in terms to Indian
Constitutional law. However, he held that there was a lot in common between
33

6

Crowley v. Christensen, (1890) 34 L. Ed. 620.
A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 220 [S. C.].
Khoday Distilleries v. Karnataka, (1995) 1 S. C. C 574 [S. C.], Punjab v. Devans
Modem Breweries, (2004) 11 S. C. C 26 [S. C.], Commissioner of Police v. Acharya
Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 S. C. C 809 [S. C.] (It was erroneously

stated in this case that the police power of the State was founded on the theory

S6

that when there was conflict between the rights of individual and the interest of the
society, the interest of the society must prevail. Based on such observation, police
power was considered as authorising restrictions on freedom of religion), Jilubhai
Nanbhai Khachar v. Gujarat, (1995) 1 S. C. C 596 [S. C.] (The police power doctrine
was used to authorise acquisition of property), Friends Colony Dev. Comm. v.
Orissa, (2004) 8 S. C. C 733 [S. C.] ("power to plan development of city and to
regulate the building activity therein flows from the police power of the state").
A. I. R. 1978 S. C. 1457 [S. C.]. Here the challenge was to the constitutionality of
Section 59(f)(v) of the Punjab Excise Act and Rule 37 of the Liquor Licence (Second
Amendment) Rules framed under this section. The impugned rule provided for A
total ban on the sale of liquor for two days of the week.
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this doctrine and the power of regulation contained in Article 19(6). This
supposed commonality was sought to be derived from the judicial frown on
trade in noxious substances in both jurisdictions. It is submitted that this
approach was wrong since the conceptual basis for these doctrines are quite
different. While police power doctrine evolved in the United States to vest
the residuary power of maintenance of peace, law and order in the States,
Article 19(6) vested the power to impose reasonable restrictions on the right
to carry on trade in the Centre as well as the States." The very exercise of this
power under Article 19(6) presupposed the existence of the right in the citizen
to carry on trade in the regulated field, while the exercise of police power
presupposed no such right. This distinction would in turn justify the
observation in Crowley v. Christensen3 that there was no inherent right to
carry on trade in liquor, as well as underscore the inapplicability of this
observation to the Indian Constitutional scheme.
Subsequent cases have blindly accepted this doctrine without deliberating
whether the theory of police power would be necessary in the light of Articles
19(2) to 19(6) in India. From these provisions, it is evident that there is no absolute
right even for the press. Every right is subject to reasonable restrictions and any
regulation by the State does not need the assistance of police power to ban trade
in liquor or create monopoly in favour of the State. This view has been accepted in
Kameshwar Prasadv. State ofBihar.39 Speaking for a five-judge bench, Justice Ayyangar
held that American cases which subjected the freedom of speech to the operation
of an imprecise police power were inapplicable when it came to resolving the
questions arising under Articles 19(1)(a) and (b) of our Constitution because the
grounds on which limitations might be placed on these rights were set out with
definiteness and precision.

IV. LIQUOR

AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

0
In Nashirwarv. Madhya Pradesh,4
the Supreme Court observed:

3

38
3

40

As correctly reasoned by Oza, J. in his concurring judgment in Synthetics &
Chemicals Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh, A. 1. R 1990 S.C. 1927 [S. C.],
the scheme of our Constitution is that there are no residuary powers
which vest in the State and the scheme of our Constitution also reveals
that in case of any conflicts it is the centre which prevails and not the State
and therefore trying to apply the doctrine of police powers which has been
conceived of in the American decisions with the Government of a State in
the United States and to apply it to a State under Indian Constitution, will
only mean to do violence to the scheme of our Constitution.
(1890) 34 L. Ed. 620.
A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1166 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 360 [S. C.].
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There are three principal reasons to hold that there is no
fundamental right of citizens to carry on trade or to do business in
liquor. First, there is the police power of the State to enforce public
morality to prohibit trades in noxious or dangerous goods. Second,
there is power of the State to enforce an absolute prohibition of
manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor. Article 47 states that
the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of
consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks
and of drugs which are injurious to health. Third, the history of
excise law shows that the State has the exclusive right or privilege
of manufacture or sale of liquor.
It is submitted that all the three reasons are untenable. It has already been
explained that the theory of police power has no place under our Constitution.
The State can trace its legislative power to enforce public morality to Articles 245
and 246 and the three Lists in Schedule VII. For instance, the entire trade of liquor
can be controlled in exercise of the powers contained in Entry 8 of List II. Similarly,
betting and gambling can be regulated in exercise of powers contained in Entry
34 of List II. The second reason is also not correct. After the first amendment, the
State has the right to create monopoly in any business. Till recently, there was
absolute prohibition on the right of any citizen to set up a television channel, an
airline or carry on an insurance business. The State monopoly automatically
implies absolute prohibition on carrying on of a particular activity by a citizen
or any other person. Article 47 will be an additional ground, and a very strong
one, to justify total prohibition but Article 47 cannot be the reason for holding
that there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or to do business in liquor.
The third reason is also incorrect. There is nothing in the history of excise law to
support the argument that there was exclusive right or privilege to manufacture
or sale of liquor. Prohibition was first introduced in the Province of Madras by
late C. Rajagopalachari in 1937. It was part of the legislative power of the State to
ban any particular activity that was injurious to health. Like alcohol, betting
and gambling were also prohibited but this was not on the basis of any privilege
or police power. The State has legislative competence to ban any activity which is
harmful to public health or public morality.
In KrishnanKumar Narula v. Jammu & Kashmir," a five-judge bench held that
none of the earlier decisions had held that the right to do business in liquor was
not a fundamental right, but this decision was distinguished in Nashirwarv. Madhya
42
Pradesh.
This case held that the decision in Narulacannot be interpreted to mean
4
42

A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1368 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 360 [S. C.].
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there is fundamental right to do business in liquor, but gave no reasons to support
this holding.
In Kerala v. P.J.Joseph," the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that the
State could not collect a commission of 20% without passing an appropriate
statutory order. The imposition, which was not authorized by law, was held to
infringe the right to carry on business under Article 19(1)(g). Similarly, in Amar
ChandraChakrabortyv. Collectorof Excise, Tripura," it was conceded by a five-judge
bench that dealing in liquor was business, and a citizen had the right to do business
in that commodity. It was added that the State could make a law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the said right in public interest. Despite this, in Har
5
Shankar v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner,4
another five-judge bench wrongly

treated this case as taking a view contrary to the earlier view expressed in Krishna
Kumar Narula v. Jammu & Kashmir." It is unfortunate that the bench in Har Shankar
failed to make the conceptual distinction between an absolute right and a
fundamental right. There is no right in Part III of the Constitution, apart from that
contained in Article 20, which is absolute in its wording or content. This does not
take away the fundamental character of these rights. It only means that reasonable
restrictions can be placed on their exercise. After noting that the earlier
Constitution bench decisions had emphasised that no person has an absolute right
to deal in liquor, Justice Chandrachud concluded that a citizen had nofendamental
right to carry on trade or business in liquor. This conclusion did not logically
follow from the precedents cited, but has now become the law of the land.
It is submitted that Article 19(1)(g) has been wrongly understood in the
context of liquor trade and, unfortunately, moral considerations have distorted
its interpretation. Once sale of liquor is permitted by a State Government, every
citizen has a fundamental right to apply for permission to trade in liquor. If he
satisfies the prescribed statutory conditions, there is no justification for denying
that citizen the right to manufacture or sell liquor.
In the Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal Jaiswal,47 it was pointed out that once
privilege is parted with, Article 14 would apply. This, in the background of our
discussion, is partly incorrect since there is no question of parting with any
privilege. However, the Supreme Court is right in stating, "when the State decides
to grant such right or privilege to others, it cannot escape the rigour of Article 14.
A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 296 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 1863 [S. C.].

4
4
4
6
4

A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1121 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1368 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1987 S. C. 251 [S. C.].
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It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality
clause while granting exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling
liquor". Therefore, it is submitted that once the State decides to allow persons to
manufacture or sell liquor, it has consciously abandoned the provisions of Article
47. It is a policy decision for each Government to prohibit or regulate trade in
liquor. Once trade is permitted, the applicability of Articles 14, 19 and even Article
301 cannot be excluded. In Punjabv. Devans Modern Breweries,48 it was recently held
that the permissive privilege to deal in liquor was not a trade and therefore,
Articles 301-304 were not attracted. This decision is clearly incorrect.

A. Liquor -Impact on Articles 301-304
The Supreme Court did not pause to consider the severe repercussions of
such a view. First,once the State permits trade in liquor, the citizen has the right to
carry on business in potable alcohol although his right may be more regulated
than any other business or trade. As long as he carries on the business, the citizen
is exercising his right to carry on business in liquor. It would be absurd to suggest
that the running of liquor shops with statutory foundation is not a trade. Licence
to manufacture or sell liquor given under the relevant Prohibition or Abkari Act
is the basis of this trade. Merely giving label of permissive privilege will not mean
that the business is carried on without any right. Secondly, Article 301 is an important
provision to maintain and safeguard the federal structure of our Constitution.
Indeed, the entire Part XIII is an important part of the federal structure of our
Constitution. The object of Part XIII is to prevent creation of trade barriers and
permit free flow of goods. It would be improper to suggest that trade barriers could
be created in liquor on the basis that no one has the right to trade in liquor.
The view of the Supreme Court in B.R. Enterprisesv. UttarPradesh49 shows the
absurdity of holding that trade in noxious substances is outside the purview of
Part XIII. This case concerned the constitutional validity of the Lotteries
(Regulation) Act, 1998. One of the contentions taken up was that States could not
have run their own lotteries extra-territorially unless this activity qualified as
"trade and business" under Article 298. If lotteries were indeed trade and business
for the purpose of Article 298, there was no reason to hold otherwise when it
came to Articles 301-304. Faced with this paradoxical situation, the Supreme
Court held that "trade and business" as used in Article 298 had a meaning different
from, and wider than, the expression "trade, commerce and intercourse" in Article
301. This leads to the absurd result that the State has the right to carry on trade
in lotteries but no freedom to do so across State borders.
4
4

(2004) 11 S. C. C. 26 [S. C.].
(1999) 9 S. C. C. 700 [S. C.].
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Privilege,Police Power and Res Extra Commercium

V. RES

EXTRA COMMERCIUM - MORALS TRUMP LAW

The theory of privilege and the police power doctrine are often taken as the
basis to justify the power of the State to prohibit or regulate trade in liquor. It is
used to justify the manner and extent of levy or duty by merely stating that such
amount is a consideration for the State parting with its privilege.
On the side of the citizen, his claim to carry on business in liquor is rejected
by invoking the Latin phrase, res extra commercium. Before analyzing the correctness
of this approach, it would be instructive to examine the genesis of this phrase.
The res extra commercium doctrine traces its conceptual roots to Roman law. Res
in commercio,in Roman law, were things capable of ownership and hence, the subject
of property rights, while res extra commercium were things incapable of ownership.
Certain kinds of property were incapable of private ownership or
acquisition because such ownership would be contrary to their natural purpose.
Such kinds of property were known as res extra commercium. Within this broad
category, there were sub-categories. A resource which by its nature could only be
used in common was called res communes. Fish, wild game, rivers, and the sea fell
into this category. Property set aside for public use by public functionaries or the
political community was categorized as res publicac. Public buildings and the
furniture within them exemplified this category. In the present day context, the
Parliament building can be considered so. Then there was a third category, res
divini, which may no longer be relevant since its subjects, res sacrac (churches) and
res religiosae(cemeteries) are now subjects of ownership. The fourth category was
res universitatiswhich included things held by a corporate body, and the last was
res nullius,meaning those things or places that belonged to no one."o It is clear from
these categories that morality had no role to play in the classification of property
as res extra commercium. In fact, no one individual could claim any right over such
property because it was meant for the common benefit of all.
If we now examine the kinds of goods and activities classified as res extra
commercium by the Indian Supreme Court, including liquour and prize competitions,
conceptually there is no difficulty at all in pin-pointing an owner who carries on
such activity or sells such commodity for private benefit. As succinctly expressed
by Justice Subba Rao (as he then was) in Krishan Kumar Narulav. Jammu & Kashmir,-"
"if the activity of a dealer in ghee is business then how does it cease to be business
if it is in liquor?"

so
51

Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515 (2002).
A. I. R. 1967 S. C. 1368 [S. C-.
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Justice Das is credited with the usage of this expression for the first time in
5
Bombay v. R.M.D Chamarbaugwala.
This case was concerned with the
2

constitutional validity of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control
and Tax Act, 1948. When dealing with the challenge to this Act on the ground
of infringement of Articles 19(1)(g) and 301-304, Justice Das held that gambling
and betting do not fall within the ambit of trade, commerce and intercourse.
The learned judge then goes on to hold that Article 19(1)(g) would not include
criminal activities. By a strange logic, Justice Das observed that if Article
19(1)(g) included gambling and betting, there would equally be a guaranteed
right to hire goondas to commit assault or even murder, to sell obscene books,
and to indulge in trafficking of women. The learned judge then proceeds to refer
to Rigveda which, in certain verses, condemns gambling and betting. Various
other provisions from scriptures and statutes are referred to show the harmful
effect of gambling and betting. Finally, we come to the sentence that introduced
the phrase "extra commercium" and became the genesis of the application of a nonexistent principle for over 50 years.
We are, however, clearly of the opinion that whatever else may or may
not be regarded as falling within the meaning of these words, gambling
cannot certainly be taken as one of them. We are convinced and satisfied
that the real purpose of Articles 19 (l)(g) and 301 could not possibly have
been to guarantee or declare the freedom of gambling. Gambling activities
from their very nature and in essence are extra-commercium although
the external forms, formalities and instruments of trade may be
employed and they are not protected either by Article 19(1)(g) or Article
301 of our Constitution.
Chief Justice Das did notuse the expression rcs extra commercium. Despite this,
his judgment has been understood in later cases as laying down the doctrine of

res extracommercium.
In fact, in an early (and solitary) decision by the Supreme Court of India,
this expression was correctly used. In AngurbalaMullick v. DebabrataMullickjs Justice
Chandrasekhara Aiyar, in his concurring judgment held that the shebaitshipof an
idol was res extra commercium as it was generally inalienable. The emphasis was
clearly on the absence of private ownership over this title, and thus in line with
the concept of res extra commercium in Roman law.
The incorrect usage of this expression, on the other hand, can be attributed
4
to the judgment of Justice Venkatarama Aiyar in R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalav. Union,
52
5
5

A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 699 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 293 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 628 [S. C.].
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a case decided on the same day as Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala."The learned
judge unfortunately interpreted the latter judgment as holding that gambling
was not trade but res extra commercium, when Das C.J. had actually held that
"gambling activitiesfrom theirvery natureandin essence are extra-commercium". There was
a world of difference between the expression "extra-commercium" as used by
Chief Justice Das and the phrase "res extra commercium" This inadvertent error by
Justice Venkatarama Aiyar has now become part of our constitutional
jurisprudence, with the Supreme Court in later decisions wholeheartedly endorsing
the "doctrine of res extra commercium" and using this doctrine to water down the
scope and effect of Article 19(1)(g) as well as Article 301.6 It is submitted that all
these decisions are per incuriam as there was no such doctrine known to law.
It is important to note that not a single Australian case cited in Bombay v.
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala7 had held that gambling or betting would amount to res
extra commercium. They have only held that the right to carry on gambling and betting
cannot be treated as trade, commerce or intercourse under Section 92 of the Australian
Constitution. This is completely different from calling it res extra commercium.
It is submitted that this expression has been wrongly used in the last sixty
years by the Supreme Court and other High Courts. No activity can be called "res
extra commercium". It is either permitted or not. Even if gambling is harmful to
society, there is nothing that prohibits the State Government from allowing
gambling casinos to function. Indeed, several State lotteries are nothing but a
form of betting and gambling. In certain countries, sale of drugs and even
prostitution is legalized. In those countries, such activities, even though harmful
to society, are as much an activity of trade as running a beauty parlour or selling
electric pumps. It is indeed unfortunate that this expression has been freely used
over the last several years. The incorrect use of this expression underscores the
importance of relying on the language used in our Constitution and shows the
pitfalls of importing doctrines and theories from other jurisdictions. It is submitted
that judicial decisions must primarily be given on the basis of our own
Constitution. It is only when the Constitution is silent or has not contemplated a
particular problem that foreign doctrine can be applied. Even then, it is necessary
to subject them to strict scrutiny.
The erroneous view that Article 19(1)(g) does not apply to noxious
substances unduly widens the power of the State in two important respects. First,
65
56

5

A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 699 [S. C.].
The subsequent decisions which firmly entrench this doctrine in our legal landscape
are Nashirwar v. Madhya Pradesh, A. 1. R. 1975 S. C. 360 [S. C.], Khoday Distilleries
v. Karnataka, (1995) 1 S. C. C. 574 [S. C.], B.R. Enterprises v. Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 9
S. C. C. 700 [S. C.], Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries, (2004) 11 S. C. C. 26 [S. C.].
A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 699 [S. C.].
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it is possible for the State to affect detrimentally the trade in such substances by
the use of mere executive power." Second, it is also possible for the State to impose
unreasonable restrictions on those employed in distilleries or in lottery agencies
since they have no right to be there.

VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

From the above discussion, the following principles emerge:

58

1.

The theory of privilege is of English origin and cannot be linked with the
concept of police power.

2.

The privilege theory has no place in the Constitution of a Republic, even
if it follows the Westminster model. Indeed, the privilege theory is wholly
unnecessary in interpreting any part of our Constitution.

3.

The police power has been referred to in the United States decisions to
justify State regulation of business and other activities. In our country,
the power to regulate business is not found on any theory of police power.
The Central and State Legislatures have inherent right to pass laws that
can regulate even the sphere of commercial or other activities. These
regulations would however have to satisfy the test of legislative
competence and non-violation of Part III, or other Constitutional
provisions.

4.

The right to trade in liquor is not the consequence of any parting of
privilege. It is an activity that is permitted or regulated by the respective
prohibition laws. If there is no concept of privilege in the Constitution,
there is no question of parting with it.

5.

Once trade in liquor is permitted, it is as much a business as any other
commercial activity. Citizens who have obtained the right to trade in
liquor are entitled to the protection of Articles 14, 19, and 301 to 304.

6.

Res extra commercium does not have the remotest connection to trade in
liquor. It is a maxim used in a totally different context.

Khoday Distilleries v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 S. C. C. 574 [S. C.1.
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